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Abstract 
Counterfeit Electronic Components (CECs) pose a serious threat to all intellectual 
properties and bring fatal failure to the key industrial systems. This paper initiates the 
exploration of the prospect of CEC detection using pulsed thermography (PT) by proposing a 
detectability evaluation method for material and structural anomalies in CECs. Firstly, a 
numerical Finite Element Modelling (FEM) simulation approach of CEC detection using PT 
was established to predict the thermal response of electronic components under the heat 
excitation. Then, by experimental validation, FEM simulates multiple models with attribute 
deviations in mould compound conductivity, mould compound volumetric heat capacity and 
die size respectively considering experimental noise. Secondly, based on principal 
components analysis (PCA), the gradients of the 1st and 2nd principal components are 
extracted and identified as two promising classification features of distinguishing the 
deviation models. Thirdly, a supervised machine learning-based method was applied to 
classify the features to identify the range of detectability. By defining the 90% of 
classification accuracy as the detectable threshold, the detectability ranges of deviation in 
three attributes have been quantitively evaluated respectively. The promising results suggest 
that PT can act as a concise, operable and cost-efficient tool for CECs screening which has 
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Counterfeit Electronic Components (CECs) have become a challenge and major threat 
to the semiconductor supply chain for civil, industrial and defence purposes globally. CECs 
and corresponding illegal trade rose from $461 billion to $509 billion between 2017 and 2019 
[1], amounting to as much as 3.3% of the world trade of intellectual property. Counterfeits 
not only defraud customers, but also present a significant drain on legitimate manufacturing 
in the electronics industry, diverting funds from brand owners who research and develop new 
products, and lending potency to organised crime [2]. Due to their lower quality, efficiency, 
increase in malfunctions and unreliability, CECs are well known to cause catastrophic injury 
and failure to operators and critical systems, creating billions of dollars losses in 
manufacturing, transport, aviation, power generation, and cybersecurity every year [3].  
The CECs can be defined as Electronic Components (ECs) with 1) unauthorised copy; 
2) inconformity to the original component manufacturer (OCM) design, models or standards; 
3) unauthorised source; 4) broken, defective, or used OCM products; 5) fraudulent markings 
or documentation [4, 5]. Figure 1 shows common counterfeit forms embedded in the supply 
chain and the corresponding defects causing them. Multiple defect types are related to the 
physical properties of ECs such as the material, internal structural anomaly (e.g. missing or 
broken die/wires, improper material, dimension and corroded or oxidated mould packaging, 
etc.) and electronic malfunctions (e.g. current leak, transistor variation, improper electrical 
heat emission etc.), while others are related to external markings and trade paperwork (e.g. 
sanding marking, forged shipping label or paperwork, etc.). In response, a few typical 
inspection techniques aimed at testing the interior and exterior integrity, and electronic 
functionality, have emerged to screen ECs in the supply chain, which can be broadly 
categorised as either physical or electrical tests [6, 7]. However, subjecting to the advantages 
4 
 
and limitations in inspection speed, cost and capability, stakeholders normally have to deploy 
manifold inspection methods in multiple supply chain stages to perfect exhaustive screening 
[8, 9]. For instance, as an exterior physical inspection, random visual spot-checking is 
popular for initial screening due to simplicity but it may result in a high uncertainty regarding 
the pass/failure product ratio if the sampling in a large number of chips is not appropriate [10]. 
X-Ray imaging [11] and Terahertz spectroscopy testings [12] are capable to analyse the 
accurate internal physical properties such as wires, circuit joint and package material, but are 
limited by low throughput, a high capital cost per inspection unit, or overly sophisticated 
methodology for unskilled operators. Electrical testing like burn-in testing, current leakage 
testing and function verification are able to detect electrical malfunctions but incapable to 
detect structural defects and aged components [13]. Therefore, an intuitive, non-contact, high 
cost-efficiency non-destructive inspection technique is highly demanded in the first stage 
 
Figure 1. Counterfeit types and typical detection methods in the entire supply chain. 
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large scale inspection for reducing the proliferation of UVECs.  
This research focuses on material and structural defects in CECs. For a conventional 
type of EC (shown in Figure 2(a)), five fundamental elements including die, mould 
compound, lead frame, pins and wiring typically feature as their main design elements. Most 
of physically unqualified CECs commonly have defects or anomalies in these five elements. 
For example, disqualified manufacturing may use an undersized die for cost-saving but 
results in a wrong die counterfeit [14]. Broken interior leads or wires may lead to low 
performance or partial malfunctions counterfeit [15]. Aged or over usage life counterfeits 
would often incur package material degradation in either the mould compound or die, caused 
by long-term thermal fatigue cycles [16]. Figure 2(b) presents a comparison between an 
authentic and a counterfeit EC in X-Ray images. The differences in mould material (indicated 
by the variation of grayscale intensity), lead frame layout and die size prove multiple 
counterfeit types mentioned above. 
Non-destructive Evaluation (NDE) techniques have been widely used and play an 
important role in structure maintenance and degradation-assessment. Among the diverse 
range of inspection methods, infrared thermography (IRT) is a powerful and promising 
technique due to its advantages of rapid, non-contact inspection approach and its ability to 
produce intuitive inspection images [17]. IRT can be divided into two modes: active and 
passive. Active thermography encompasses different approaches according to the choice of 
heat source, including flash [18], laser [19], eddy current [20] and ultrasonic vibration. The 
heating mode differs between pulse, lock-in and modulated patterns, selected according to the 
appropriate type of defect. The eddy current thermography has been proven to be effective 
for detecting the degradations of insulated gate bipolar transistor circuit module especially for 
bond wires and layers joint [21]. Compared to eddy current and laser thermography, the 
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Pulsed Thermography (PT) employing instantaneous flash is highly competent with remote 
excitation distance and larger heating area for inspection, such a characteristic is attractive for 
ECs inspection because it allows inspecting a significant number of components 
simultaneously, facilitating a rapid and cost-efficient inspection per part. In addition, the 
relatively concision, operability and low-budget contribute that the PT system can be 
deployed and embedded into multiple stages on the supply chain. Therefore, development of 
such a rapid, reliable and cost-efficient PT inspection for CECs will provide a powerful tool 
for CECs detection, especially in the initial large scale screening stage.  
 
Quantitative damage characterisation in single metal and composite structures by sizing 
shape and depth has been well studied and proven to be effective by PT [22-25]. These 
researches are performed based on the assumption that the targeted defects are detectable. 
However, as a new inspection technique employed to anti-counterfeits, the thermal response 
and corresponding detectability using PT for different types of material and structure 
anomaly are still unknown. It is therefore essential to clarify the detectability of each type of 
counterfeit anomaly or defect in thermography, in order to ascertain the detectability of the 
technique for a given counterfeit-derived anomaly. This work aims to evaluate the 
detectability of PT for anomalies in mould compound thermal properties and die chip size; 
  
(a)                                                                              (b) 
Figure 2. Typical structure of EC.  (a) Simplified structure of a conventional dual in-line package (DIP) 
electronic component; (b) Comparison of authentic and counterfeit ECs in X-ray images. 
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enabling the boundaries of detectability to be established before the experiment, providing a 
means to assess the method’s capability for several defect types. 
To quantitatively investigate the detectability of a specific anomaly parameter, two 
challenges are crucial to this investigation. The first is that the counterfeit samples with 
standardised levels of anomaly are difficult to collect. To address this challenge, the 
modelling simulation for PT thermal response of CECs is proposed in this research. To model 
the ECs, several studies have been investigated to predict the thermal temperature response of 
the die part for electronic performance evaluation and manufacturing design. Initial 
researches focus on the electro-thermal analysis of the interior chip and die, where the heat 
source is generated by electrical power charging the chip [26]. Leila et al. proposed an 
analytical modelling solution for steady-state and transient temperature field in a type of 
vertically stacked die [27]. However, the excitation manner, heating position and temperature 
behaviour in these studies are different from the proposed PT inspection of CECs, therefore a 
simulation investigation for PT thermal response of CECs is necessary. The second challenge 
for evaluating the PT technique involves the effective decision-making criteria for judging 
the detectability of mould compound material and die structure from PT, which is still 
unclear. The use of a machine learning classification algorithm to characterise the damage 
has been attracting increasing attention in maintenance industries [28]; studies that have been 
conducted to automatically determine the defects in material [29] and deterioration in 
infrastructure [30] where traditional NDE techniques such as ultrasonic testing, radar, 
acoustic emission, infrared thermography and Terahertz spectroscopy have been used [31, 
32]. In material identification, Aujeszky et al. proposed a material classification approach 
using laser thermography that can differentiate a variety of materials such as plastic, coal, 
marble etc [33]. However, the investigated objects are single material with homogenous 
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distribution and are excited by a small laser spot, which is not necessarily suitable for the 
CECs with complex structures inspected in PT. To discriminate the detectability of a certain 
counterfeit type, with the uncertainties and errors associated with the inspection itself, it is 
essential to establish a group of anomaly features and address the classification accuracy to 
resolve the smallest limitation of anomaly that can be captured by PT.  
This paper is an effort to answer the aforementioned challenges and thus proposes a 
numerical approach to predict the thermal response of the standardised level of counterfeit 
anomalies, and then introduces a machine learning classification approach to estimate the 
detectability of the material and interior structural anomalies of CECs. This paper is 
organised as follows: Section 2 presents the overall methodology and the numerical 
modelling of ECs in PT. In Section 3, feature extraction and machine learning-based 
classification are introduced. Section 4 presents the results and discussion, and conclusions 
are given in Section 5. 
2. Methods 
2.1 Overall Methodology 
 
 
Figure 3.  The principle of the proposed methodology 
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Figure 3 shows an overview of the proposed methodology to investigate the 
detectability of various counterfeit types for ECs using PT. 
Initially, a model-based finite element model (FEM) is established to predict the 
temperature response of ECs after the heating, and then an experimental test of PT is 
performed to inform the selection of parameters in FEM and evaluate the experimental noise 
for refining the model. By simulating a series of standardised levels of anomalous models and 
introducing different levels of noise, the datasets to represent the thermal behaviour of the 
inspected CECs are established. Secondly, the simulated datasets are processed with principal 
component analysis (PCA) to extract the key features. These feature datasets are carefully 
prepared to form the training and validation datasets for developing and validating a machine 
learning classifier. Then the classifier aims to differentiate and label the anomalous models 
from the reference model. Through defining an appropriate threshold, the classification 
accuracy of each clustered result can in return provide an indicator of detectable range of the 
anomalous parameters referring to counterfeits against the reference parameters. 
2.2 Finite element modelling and simulation 
 
In this research, a typical EC fabricated with dual in-line package shown in Figure 4 is 
adopted as a typical use case. A simplified 3D model is established with a four-layer 
structure, shown in Figure 5, which consists of double mould compound layers, lead frame 
layer and die layer, representing a conventional EC. The detailed structures of lead frame, 
 
Figure 4.  The dimensions of investigated EC. 
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pins and die are modelled as homogenous layers. The thermal properties of material in each 
layer are approximately estimated using the commonly used material [20] shown in Table 1. 
 
The transient thermal response of PT inspection can be simulated by the heat conduction 
equation shown in Eq. (1).   
           T T cT Q    − = −                                           (1) 
                   K T C T Q+ =                                               (2) 
where T and {∇} denote the temperature and gradient vector and –Q|Γ is the excitation heat 
flux applied on the surface. κ, ρ and c denote the heat conductivity, density and specific heat 
of material respectively. Assuming no heat loss, the temperature of the tested sample can be 
conducted by the FEM governing equation Eq. (2), where [K], [C] and {Q} stand for 
coefficient stiffness matrix of conductivity, volumetric specific heat and excitation heat 
source respectively. To solve Eq. (2), a time-domain integration solver was employed as (3) 
[34]. In (3), ζ=0.5 is a convergence parameter that controls the calculation stability and 
accuracy. Additionally, to calculate the surface temperature response, the model is based on 
the following assumptions: 
(1) The material selected is homogenous and isotropic. 
(2) The ambient thermal equilibrium conditions are used. 
(3) The constant thermal properties are used and the thermal expansion effect is neglected.   
(4) Non-adiabatic surrounding condition is adopted and the EC model is surrounded by air 
elements.  
Table 1 Material thermal properties 
Component (Material type) Mould conductivity Mould volumetric heat capacity 
Mould Compound (Mould resin) 7.2 W/(m⋅K) 1.33×106 J/K/m3 
Lead frame and pins (Copper) 3.85×102 W/(m⋅K) 3.45×106 J/K/m3 
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In PT, a homogenous flash is used to heat the top surface of the sample. Considering the 
smaller size of EC, the heat energy intensity induced on single EC can be regarded as 
uniform heating. The temporal pulse wave of heating is as shown in Figure 5(c). The pulse 
peak of heat flux density applied on the surface elements is 5.0×104 W/m2. 
2.3 Model validation through experimental tests 
To validate the simulation, an experimental test was performed on a group of 
representative EC samples; in this case common operational amplifiers. These were randomly 
selected to represent frequently used electronic components that also provide a comparatively 
 
(a) 
    
(b)                                                           (c) 
Figure 5. The modelling of PT inspection. (a) The established model of target EC; (b) A slice of the model in X 
direction; (c) The flash intensity of the heating pulse. 
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large surface area. This consideration is significant in the early stages of the work for 
enabling a simple comparison between simulation results and captured data, before applying 
it to real CECs and their genuine counterparts. The experimental setup of PT is illustrated in 
Figure 6(a), where a short and high-energy light pulse was projected onto the sample surface 
through double flash lamps. An infrared camera controlled by a PC captures the time-
dependent response of the sample surface temperature. The experiments were conducted 
using the Thermoscope® II pulsed-active thermography system (see in Figure 6(b)) that 
comprises of two capacitor bank powered Xenon flash lamps mounted in an internally 
reflective hood and a desktop PC to capture and store data. A FLIR SC7000 series infrared 
(IR) radiometer operating between 3-5.1 µm and a spatial resolution of 640×510 pixels was 
used to perform the inspection with a sampling framerate of 100 Hz. The samples were 
placed with their surface perpendicular to the IR camera’s line of sight at 250 mm from the 
lens. The sample surface was assumed with an emissivity of 0.95 with a 5% reflectivity. The 
energy applied was approximately 2 kJ over an inspection area of 200 mm × 200 mm. The 
pixel pitch is 0.32 mm.  
A group of ten same samples mounted on a black foam plate were inspected (see Figure 
6(c)). Figure 7(a) shows a raw temperature thermogram (the sixth frame after the flash) of the 
test board inspected from the top side. By extracting the temperature response of center 
points, Figure 7(b) presents the temporal profile of each sample within one-second post flash. 
It illustrates a small difference between each sample in temperature peak and decays after one 
pulse flash. The experimental results can not only verify the simulation model but also 




The temperature distribution of the model and the results of center slice at 0.02 second 
are shown in Figure 8(a), which presents a clear temperature distribution and penetration 
through the mould compound to the die layer. After obtaining the experimental results, a 
region of interest (ROI) is extracted for further analysis to compare the simulation and 
experimental data. Figure 8(b) presents the time evolution of transient temperature profiles at 
the center point location of the simulated model and the samples No.1, No.2 and No.5. Figure 
8(c) shows the temperature spatial distribution of four different time stamps at the centerline 
shown in Figure 8(a). The experimental results demonstrate that the results agree with the 
predictions of both the temporal and spatial profile of the EC provided by the simulation 
model. Based on the simulation results and respective comparison, the reference values of our 




(b)                                                   (c) 
Figure 6. System framework. (a) Experimental configuration of the PT inspection; (b) A snapshot of the
experimental system; (c) The layout of EC samples in the experiment 
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references to investigate the detectability of parameter deviation. To briefly describe the three 
attributes deviation mentioned above, conductivity, volumetric heat capacity and die size will 
be used in the sections below. And also “anomaly” will be used to denote the attributes 
deviation below, unless specified otherwise. 
 
To obtain the thermal response more practically, experimental temporal noise was 
analysed and then introduced to the simulated response. Shepard [17] proposed a Thermal 
Signal Reconstruction (TSR) technique to reduce temporal noise using a high order 
polynomial model to fit the temperature cooling curve. The model can be written as Eq. (4): 
   
0
ln ( ) ln ( )
N i
ii
T t a T t
=
=                                                   (4) 
where T(t) is the surface temperature at time t, N is the model order, and ai are coefficients to 
be estimated. Once the unknown coefficient ai is estimated by the least square method, the 
temperature behaviour can be reconstructed to replace the raw data. Then both raw data and 
reconstructed data were compared to calculate the SNR using Eq. (5), where Texpt and Tpoly 
denote the experimental signal and TSR signal, respectively. After calculation of all samples, 
the results indicate that the mean SNR for these samples is around 64dB. To ensure the 
stability of experiments, all ten samples were retested one-by-one in the same environment 
        
(a)                                                              (b) 
Figure 7. Experimental results. (a) A raw temperature image after flash (Frame 6); (b) Temperature profile of 
the center point of each sample. 
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and the SNR of the surface temperature signal was evaluated by TSR respectively. The SNR 
values of the five samples are shown in Figure 8(d). Considering the uncertainty occurring 
due to multiple tests or operators, random noises with an SNR of 60dB (averaged noise in 
experiments is around 64dB) was introduced into the simulated temperature response to 











                                                (5) 
 
(a) 
   
(b)                                                          (c)                                                     (d) 
Figure 8. Comparison between simulated and experimental results. (a) The simulated results of model at 0.02s; 
(b) Comparison of center point transient temperature profiles; (c) Centerline temperature distribution of four 




3. Detectability Estimation Using Machine Learning Classification 
3.1 Feature extraction 
To reveal the variation of thermal response that could be caused by counterfeit parts, 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is used for the extraction of the spatial and temporal 
information from a thermographic matrix formed by an image sequence. PCA has been 
shown to yield high levels of thermal contrast for underlying structural damage resulting in 
satisfactory detectability compared to conventional thermographic procedures [35]. 
The Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) is a powerful method to compute the principal 
component analysis. In general, the SVD of an M×N matrix A (M>N) is a factorisation of the 
following equation: 
    TA URV=                                                            (6) 
where U is an M×N orthogonal matrix, R is a diagonal matrix (with the non-negative singular 
values of A on the diagonal) and VT is the transpose of an N×N orthogonal matrix. The 
thermal image sequence is arranged in a form of the time steps as the column-wise and the 
pixels as the row-wise of A. And the columns of decomposed U comprise the orthogonal 
statistical modes known as Empirical Orthogonal Functions (EOF) which describes the 
spatial variation in the thermograms. Likewise, the Principal Components (PCs), which 
describes the temporal variation, comprises the rows in matrix VT. Commonly, the first two 
orders of EOFs and PCs provide sufficient description of data variability in space and time 
domain.  







Reference value 7.2 W/(m⋅K) 1.33×106 J/K/m3 9.0 mm × 3.0 mm×0.6 mm 
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In this research, the purpose is to identify the anomaly level in the bulk material and die 
size which affects the temperature response of the entire surface more evidently rather than a 
region on the surface. In PT, the flash covers the entire heating surface of ECs in which the 
main thermal transfer occurs along the depth direction. To evaluate the representation ability 
for a counterfeit-introduced anomaly using PCs as the features, three gross-graded groups of 
parametric error models are generated for representing three types of attributes. Regarding 
the reference value of three parameters as the genuine value, the gross-graded error models 
consisting of nine bias of each parameter starts from -40% to +40% with an equivalent 
interval of 10%. 
After simulating all models, the SVD was performed on the modelled temperature image 
sequence without noise to obtain the PCs. For conductivity, Figure 9 (a) and (b) respectively 
shows the transient curve of 1st PCs and 2nd PCs of the anomaly models. The 1st and 2nd PCs 
     
(a)                                              (b)                                              (e) 
     
(c)                                                  (d)                                             (f) 
Figure 9. The results of PCA results and feature extraction of conductivity. (a) The 1st PCs profiles; (b) The 2nd
PCs profiles; (c) The gradient of 1st PCs; (d) The gradient of 2nd PCs; (e) No.1 feature of the peak slop of 1st




(a)                                              (b)                                                (e)    
 
(c)                                                  (d)                                               (f) 
Figure 10. The results of PCA results and feature extraction of volumetric heat capacity. (a) The 1st PCs
profiles; (b) The 2nd PCs profiles; (c) The gradient of 1st PCs; (d) The gradient of 2nd PCs; (e) No.1 feature of the 
peak slop of 1st PCs; (f) No.2 feature of peak to peak value of 2nd PCs; 
can easily distinguish differences between the models. From the gradient graph of the 1st PCs 
shown in Figure 9(c), it can be observed that the 1st PC gradient curve has a single peak and 
the peak appears with higher amplitude and sharper with an increase in thermal conductivity. 
By defining the peak slope as the feature No.1, represented by the peak value dividing its 
respective time of appearance, Figure 9(e) shows that the No.1 feature exhibits increasing 
monotonicity with increasing conductivity. Figure 9(d) presents the gradients of the 2nd PCs. 
By selecting the peak-to-peak distance, which grows with an increase in conductivity, the 
No.2 feature (see Figure 9(f)) to describe the parameter variation is obtained.   
Likewise, the 1st PCs and 2nd PCs of anomaly models for volumetric heat capacity were 
also analysed by PCA (see Figure 10(a) and 10(b)). The peak slope of the 1st PC gradients 
(see Figure 10(c)) and the peak-to-peak value of the 2nd PC gradients (see Figure 10(d)) were 





(a)                                              (b)                                              (e)     
 
(c)                                                  (d)                                             (f) 
Figure 11. The results of PCA results and feature extraction of die size. (a) The 1st PCs profiles; (b) The 2nd PCs
profiles; (c) The gradient of 1st PCs; (d) The gradient of 2nd PCs; (e) No.1 feature of the peak slop of 1st PCs; (f) 
No.2 feature of the peak to peak value of 2nd PCs; 
No.2 features present clear decreasing monotonicity with the volumetric heat capacity 
growing which is consistent with the reciprocal relation between conductivity and the 
volumetric heat capacity. Viewing the feature trends of above two mould material anomalies, 
the No. 1 feature (peak slope) represents the time and the energy intensity when the excitation 
heat reaches the lead frame and die layers. The No.2 feature (peak-to-peak value) indicates 
the amount of heat penetrating through the mould and also the temperature rise of the die and 
lead layer. Similarly, the No.1 and No.2 features extracted from 1st and 2nd PC gradients (see 
Figure 11(c) and Figure 11 (d)) for die anomalous size models are presented in Figure 11(e) 
and Figure 11(f) respectively. Although the variation of features for die size anomalies are 
not as obvious as the other two parameters, they still maintain a linear relationship with 
parameter step change. For the anomaly of die size, similar physical reasoning can be applied. 
The No. 1 and No.2 features indicate that the temperature rise changes (e.g. significant 
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amplitude changes of two features) at the die layer when the same amount of heat reaches the 
die at almost the same time (e.g. not significant time changes of two features). 
 
Based on the analysis above, all noised data of anomaly models were analysed to obtain 
the features.  As shown in the scatter plot of double features in Figure 12 (a), (b) and (c), the 
scattered dots of double features for each noised anomalous model are grouped together in 
terms of the value of each parameter. This demonstrates a strong potential to perform 
detectability estimation by clustering the feature points using machine learning classification 
approaches. To more finely characterise anomaly detectability based on the genuine reference 
model, finer anomalous levels are necessary, and the target focus should be on the 
classification of different features of counterfeit and genuine models, respectively. 
3.2 Detectability estimation using machine learning classification 
After the identification of important features, this paper proposes to use support vector 
machine (SVM), a popular machine-learning-based supervised classification method, to 
determine if two feature groups generated by different values of a certain parameter (e.g. 
conductivity) can be distinguished. It should be noted that other methods, such as KNN or 
decision tree, can also be applied. SVM was selected due to its fine performance and wide 
      
(a)                                                  (b)                                                      (c) 
Figure 12. The scatter distribution of No.1 feature and No.2 feature of three parameters. (a) Conductivity; (b) 
Volumetric heat capacity; (c) Die size; 
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applicability. Cross-validation is employed in this paper to evaluate the classification 
performance. The data were initially divided into N folders, and N − 1 folders are then 
selected for the training and the remaining folder was utilised for the testing requirement. 
This step is repeated N times until each folder has been used for the testing, and the accuracy 
is finally averaged. Cross-validation combines measures of fitness in prediction to derive a 
more accurate estimate of model prediction performance [36]. In this paper, 10-fold cross-
validation was used. If the classification accuracy between the reference group and the testing 
group is larger than a certain threshold, the parameter value of the testing group is determined 
as “detectable”, otherwise marked as “undetectable”. By this means, the detectability from 
the variation of each parameter can be detected. For this work, the threshold was set at 90%. 
The proposed strategy of detectability estimation can be summarised as: 
(1) Establish the feature database of the anomaly models where various deviations of each 
parameter from the reference are tested; 
(2) Separate the database into training and validation sets using 10-fold cross-validation; 
(3) Train a series of binary classifiers between each anomaly model and the reference model 
using the SVM algorithm; 
(4) Calculate the classification accuracy of each classifier on the validation set; 
(5) Repeat step 2) to 5) until every folder of data has been selected as the validation set and 
the classification accuracy is averaged; 
(6) Define a threshold of classification accuracy to determine the detectability. If the 
accuracy for an anomalous level is larger than the threshold, this anomaly level of the 
parameter is regarded as detectable. Otherwise, this level will be decided as undetectable; 




4. Results and discussion 
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the detectability of the mould material and the die’s 
structural attributive anomaly can be estimated by the clustering approach. To accurately 
obtain the detectability level, a finer graded anomaly group using an equal interval level in 
the log domain from -10% to +10% deviation was applied on the reference values of three 
parameters to make three corresponding counterfeiting sets. Each set consists of 30 anomaly 
models and a reference model. All models were then simulated using the proposed FEM. 
Thermal response data of each anomaly model was added with noise with an SNR of 60dB 
for 40 times to generate the raw dataset for detectability estimation. In total, 1240 feature 
pairs (31 anomaly models multiplied by 40 noised cases) were available for each counterfeit 
parameter. As shown in Figure 13 (a), (c) and (e), the feature space of three anomaly datasets 
from -5% error model to +5% error model are described in the box chart. The statistics 
analysis was conducted on the 40 times repeated addition of noise. It can be seen that the 
trends of two features in the box chart are consistent on the monotonicity obtained in the 
feature extraction section. Also, the box chart exhibits clear data overlapping of feature points 
between anomaly models. This phenomenon indicates that the smaller the anomalous level is, 
the feature datasets will locate closer to the data of the reference model. This means it will be 
more difficult to differentiate them from the reference model.  
In addition, to ensure the SVM is the best clustering algorithm in this scenario, the 
comparison of classification accuracy from K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN), Linear Discriminant 
Analysis (LDA), Decision Tree (DT) and SVM algorithms are presented in Table 3. Several 
anomaly levels are selected to observe the accuracy differentiation and the best results for 
each level are highlighted in bold in Table 3. It can be observed that the SVM can acquire the 
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best cluster accuracy in most cases demonstrating the superiority of SVM over other common 
clustering algorithms. 
 
Within 40 groups of data for each model, the results of classification accuracy for three 
parameters were then acquired, as presented in Figure 13(b), Figure 13(d) and Figure 13(f) 
respectively. These results demonstrate that the accuracy approaches 100% when the model 
anomalies exceed 5% of the references, thus demonstrating the capability, reliability and the 
success rate of detecting anomalies within these ranges using PT. With the anomaly error 
level decreasing, the accuracy decreases, indicating that the detectability follows closely.  
Setting a 90% of classification accuracy as the detectable threshold, the detectable range for 
the three parameters can be observed from Figure 13(b), Figure 13(d) and Figure 13(f). In 
addition, it can be observed that, unlike the parameters’ errors distribution, the accuracy 
distribution of anomaly models is not symmetric. This is due to how the positive and negative 
errors of each parameter influence the heat transfer behaviour of the whole component, 
yielding differences which are inherently asymmetric. For example, the positive error of 
mould thermal conductivity means improved heat transfer capability. The same level of noise 
will lead to a smaller influence on the result than the lower heat transfer models represented 
by the negative error. Therefore, the detectability for conductivity on the positive error is 
greater than the negative error. Similar explanations are also applicable to the parameters of 
volumetric heat capacity and the die size.  The detectable range of three anomaly parameters 
Table 3 classification accuracy of different algorithm. 
Anomaly level KNN LDA DT SVM 
+1% 60.00% 63.75% 53.75% 65.00% 
-1% 61.25% 68.25% 55.00% 71.25% 
+2.57% 88.75% 92.50% 80.00% 90.00% 
-2.57% 88.75% 85.00% 86.25% 88.75% 
+3.01% 93.75% 95.00% 87.50% 96.25% 
-3.01% 83.75% 87.50% 82.50% 87.50% 
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is summarised in Table 4. These results have demonstrated the feasibility of the proposed 
method to characterise the detectability of several materials and interior structural 
counterfeits in ECs, providing a reasonable and clear pathway for detectability estimation 
based on the combination of simulation modelling and machine learning classification, 
instead of collecting thousands of standardised CEC samples.   
It should be noted that the detectable range for the counterfeit is based on the ECs and 
the 90 % threshold set. In practice, the range will vary from different ECs and the threshold 
used. A more restricted tolerance will result in a lower detectability. The strategy of optimal 
threshold selection should be analysed in future research based on sufficient prior knowledge 
from manufacturing and quality control process, from which the detectability result will be 
more meaningful in return. 
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Following these results, some issues and alternatives require consideration. One aspect 
of the problem provides that the material and inner structural anomalies of CECs may 
        
(a)                                                 (b) 
       
(c)                                                (d) 
       
(e)                                                (f) 
Figure 13. The feature spaces and estimated detectability range of three counterfeit parameters. (a) The feature 
trends of conductivity in box chart; (b) The estimated detectability of conductivity; (c) The feature trends of 
volumetric heat capacity in box chart; (d) The estimated detectability of volumetric heat capacity; (e) The 
feature trends of die size in box chart; (f) The estimated detectability of die size. 
26 
 
significantly vary from different types of counterfeit. In this circumstance, as a supervised 
machine learning methodology, the features extracted from PCA may not exactly match with 
those used in this paper (peak slope of 1st PCs and peak-to-peak value of 2nd PCs). For 
detection of counterfeits with local defects (i.e. fake surface coating or missing wire 
counterfeits), the features from EOFs which mainly represent spatial variance will be more 
effective for machine learning classification.  
In order to extend its suitability for multiple types of EC, the selection and optimisation 
of PT inspection parameters and modelling various inspection problems contribute to the 
assessment of the desired detection capability. For larger and thicker components, higher 
pulse energy and longer heating duration should be selected to ensure sufficient induced 
power and resulting thermal behaviour being captured. Meanwhile, the data capture method 
referring to sampling rate, ROI and the temperature decay sections corresponding to different 
ECs and pulse modes should be investigated further, as inspection parameters have a 
significant impact on the quality of data for performing the target inspection. 
The proposed method explores the detection feasibility using PT for CECs. Due to the 
features of PT, it provides a powerful and cost-efficient technique for the first stage large 
scale screening to reduce the proliferation of counterfeits. Based on the numerical simulation, 
the surface thermal signals of multiple standardised levels of anomalous ECs can be predicted 
before gathering and inspecting the large quantity of counterfeit chips. It furtherly simplifies 
the evaluation procedure and promotes detectability resolution. In addition, the machine 
learning decision-making strategy can provide operators with a fast and stable decision which 
is also very suitable for the inspection scenario of large quantity screening. However, it 
should be noted that the visualisation resolution and detectability of PT for small internal 
defects (e.g. missing or broken wires, electrical malfunction die) are not as high as other 
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techniques like X-Ray or THz testing with strong penetration capability. A combination of 




Different from most of PT related researches targeting on damage/defect characterisation, 
this paper is aimed at investigating its feasibility of the detection of CECs. In this research, a 
detectability estimation approach was proposed to identify the detectable limits of the 
material and its inner structural anomalies in CECs based on thermal transfer FEM simulation 
approach. The results show the following. 
(1) FEM simulation can effectively predict the transient thermal response signal of 
electronic components in the PT inspection. Furthermore, the simulation approach can 
provide the multiple inspection signals which come from standardised levels of an 
anomaly in material and structural counterfeit components. Compared to experimental 
testing, a significant amount of standardised counterfeit samples are not required.  
(2) For the anomalies in the mould compound material and die structure, by using PCA, the 
first two PCs are strongly correlated with three parameters of mould compound thermal 
conductivity, volumetric heat capacity and inner die size. It has been observed that the 
peak slop of the 1st PCs gradient curve and the peak-to-peak value of the 2nd PCs 
gradient curve have good monotonicity with changing of the above three parameters. 
This observation allows deriving a categorisation scenario of the anomaly features to 
Table 4 The detectability range 
Counterfeit parameter Reference value Detectable range of anomaly 
Mould heat conductivity 7.2 W/(m⋅K) Error > -3.53% or +2.57% 
Mould volumetric heat capacity 1.33×106  J/K/m3 Error > -3.53% or +3.01% 
Die size 9.0 mm × 3.0mm × 0.6 mm Error > -4.13% or +3.01% 
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represent the variation of each anomaly model, which enables the quantitative 
estimation of detectability using a supervised machine learning classification approach. 
(3) Machine learning classification based on the support vector machine algorithm can 
successfully detect the detectable range of investigating counterfeit anomaly when an 
appropriate classification accuracy threshold is selected.  
(4) The proposed framework can effectively assess the detectability of material and 
structural anomalies based on the decision making of machine learning classification. 
The detectable range for mould compound conductivity anomaly is greater than -3.53% 
or +2.57% error, and for the mould compound, the volumetric heat capacity is greater 
than -3.53% or +3.01% error. The detectable range for die size is larger than -4.13% 
with a +3.01% error. 
It should be noted that this is a feasibility study. To fully explore its potential and improve 
the versatility, a further study is required by accurately modelling the detailed inner material 
and structures for different types of ECs. In addition, as a data-driven approach based on 
machine learning, it is also necessary to emphasise that simulation is a more straight-forward 
method for data accumulation than the real case. Also, as some difficulty in collecting a 
sufficient number of CECs with standardized defects from customers, manufacturers and 
even from gray market can be expected. The experiment investigation should be implemented 
with a sufficient volume of CEC examples with support from manufacturers and active 
participants in the electronic parts supply chain. 
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